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The Appellees, Jane Harper, Richard D. Harper, Frank Cattelan,
Richard Richins and the Dicker Hill Trust (hereinafter referred to
collectively as "Appellees"), each Plaintiffs below, submit this
Reply Brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
ORDERING REMOVAL OF THE UTELITE FACILITY
Appellants Summit County and Utelite argue that the Utelite

facility is an "accessory to a non-conforming use" in an attempt to
overturn

summary

judgment

for

two

reasons:

(1) to

avoid

the

undisputed facts demonstrating that the County Planning Commission
illegally allowed the Utelite aggregate

loading

facility as a

"permitted use" in a rural residential zone1; and (2) to create a
fact dispute as to whether the loading facility is an "accessory
use" to a non-conforming use.

This argument is nothing more than

post hoc justification for the improper siting of the Utelite
facility.
The

record

is

clear.

The

County

Planning

classified the facility as a "permitted use."

Commission

The first time that

it was suggested that the facility was an "accessory to a nonconforming use" occurred after the facility had been built, and it
was

by

the Assistant

County Attorney.

1

This

"after-the-fact"

The Development Code explicitly lists the uses allowed in a
rural residential zone, and a commercial loading facility is not
included. Development Code § 12.20; see Appellee's Opening Brief
at 22.
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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classification had nothing to do with the decision allowing Utelite
to locate its facility.
Moreover, the classification was wrong.
"accessory to a nonconforming use."
Code2

does

not

nonconforming

authorize
uses

and

or

The Summit County Development

even

cannot

There cannot be an

mention

be

uses

interpreted

nonconforming use to be expanded as an accessory.

accessory
to

to

allow

a

Specifically,

the Development Code states:
The nonconforming use of land, existing at the time this
Code became effective, may be continued, provided that no
such nonconforming use of land shall in any way be
expanded or extended either on the same or adjoining
property, and provided that if such nonconforming use of
land, or any portion thereof, is abandoned or changed for
a period of one (1) year or more, any future use of such
land shall be in conformity with the provisions of this
Code.
Development Code § 3.7 (emphasis added) . Even if Appellants claim
that

the Railroad

is a nonconforming

use, the Code

expressly

prohibits the expansion that Appellants advocate.
Furthermore, the common law of zoning does not authorize the
expansion of a nonconforming use by claiming it is an accessory.3
The Idaho Supreme Court, for example, in County of Ada v. Schemm,
529 P.2d 1268 (Idaho 1974), applied a zoning law nearly identical
to Summit County's to hold that one could not maintain a new

2

Although Appellants never cite to it in their brief,
Appellees implore the Court to carefully review Chapter 3 of the
Development Code. See Addendum A. 3 to Appellees' Opening Brief.
3

Appellants have been unable to identify a
examining zoning provisions like those in this case.
g:\3lw\echo\brief.a21
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Utah

case

building as an "accessory" to an existing nonconforming structure.4
Schemm at 1270.

The Schemm Court stated:

even if appellants' argument that the structure is an
accessory use be accepted (respondent-County argues
vehemently to the contrary) nevertheless such accessory
use to a nonconforming use is not authorized and is
prohibited by the zoning ordinance. Such interpretation
comports with the general concept of zoning policy that
nonconforming uses should not be allowed to expand and
eventually should be eliminated.
Schemm at 1270 (citing O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 202 P.2d 401
(Idaho 194 9);

Cole-Collister

Boise, 468 P.2d
Zoning, § 6.07).

290

Fire Protection Dist. v. City of

(1970); 1 R.M. Anderson, American Law of

It is a basic concept that:

[b]ecause non-conforming uses and structures, so long as
they exist, prevent full realization of the zoning plan,
the spirit of zoning is, and has been, to restrict,
rather than increase, such non-conformities and to
eliminate such uses as speedily as possible.
2 A. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 62-1 (3d Ed.). 5

4

The definitions for "nonconforming use" and "accessory" in
the ordinance at issue in the Schemm case are similar to those in
the Summit County Development Code.
According to the Schemm
ordinance, a nonconforming use is:
A building, structure or premises legally existing and/or
used at the time of adoption of this Ordinance, or any
amendment thereto, and which does not conform with the
use regulations of the district in which located.
Ada County Zoning Ordinance § 2.086 as quoted in Schemm at 1269.
Compare with Summit County Development Code §§ 1-6(51), (52). An
accessory use is defined as:
A use or structure subordinate to the principal use on
the same lot and serving a purpose customarily incidental
to the use or the principal building.
Ada County Zoning Ordinance § 2.002 as quoted in Schemm at 1269.
Compare with Summit County Development Code § 1-6(63).
5

Further, the addition of new facilities would most likely be
regarded as an extension of use if the nonconforming use is thereby
rendered more incompatible with permitted uses, if the volume or
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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Appellants stretch to avoid Summit County's Development Code
and

these

well-accepted

principles

arguing

that

the

loading

facility could be located at any point along the railroad right-ofway because "the entire tract is generally regarded as within the
exemption of an existing nonconforming use, although the entire
tract is not so used at the time of the passage or effective date
of the zoning ordinance."6

Appellants' Reply Brief at 4.

This

statement directly contradicts section 3.7 of the Development Code,
which provides that "no such nonconforming use of land shall in any
way be

expanded

property."

or extended

either

on the

same

or

adjoining

Development Code § 3.7 (emphasis added).

Appellants also attempt to circumvent the Development Code in
their argument regarding the necessity of a building permit.

They

assert that a fact issue existed due to an affidavit, prepared by
the County Attorney, from a building inspector that claimed the
loading

"apparatus"

originally

installed

was

an

"accessory

intensity of use is increased, or if the nature of the use is
substantially changed.
83 Am Jur 2d Zoning and Planning § 664
(citing Paramount Rock Co. v. County of San Diego, 4 Cal. Rptr. 317
(where a rock crusher was installed at a nonconforming sand pit);
County of San Diego v. McClurken, 234 P. 2d 972 (where storage tanks
were replaced with tanks double the size); State v. Perry, 178 A. 2d
279 (where a use was changed from an ice-cream company to a cold
storage facility).
6

Appellants cite Gibbons & Reed v. North Salt Lake City, 431
P. 2d 559, 564 (Utah 1967) . However, Gibbons did not address a
zoning ordinance like the one in this case. Further, the Gibbons
case is clearly distinguishable because it involved a narrow
exception to the nonconforming use of extracting gravel -- a
"diminishing asset." This narrow doctrine has never been applied
to a case like this one.
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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building,"

and

requirements.

as

such

was

exempt

from

building

permit

Under the Development Code, the Utelite facility

would be considered a "structure" requiring a building permit.
Development

Code

§§

1.6(61) and

1.9.

Factually,

the

County

recognized that it was necessary for Utelite to secure a permit by
belatedly requiring it to obtain a building permit.

R. at 97; 3 56;

2879.
II.

THE SUMMIT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CODE AND UTAH LAW SUPPORT
REMOVAL OF THE UTELITE FACILITY
Appellants also erroneously claim that Appellees provided no

legal basis for the remedy of removal.

Appellees specifically

cited sections of the Development Code, Utah statutory law and case
law, all authorizing order of removal.

Appellees' Brief at 22-24;

Development Code § 1.16; U.C.A. § 17-27-23; Utah County v. Baxter,
635 P. 2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981) (holding that a zoning violation is
tantamount to irreparable harm) .7

As a matter of law, a use not

7

In an attempt to discount the applicability of U.C.A. § 1727-23, Appellants comment that this section was repealed in 1992.
Reply Brief of Appellants at 15.
This comment is of no worth
because (1) this section existed during the relevant period
involved in this case, and (2) the 1992 amendments contain a
provision with similar language. The current "Enforcement" section
17-27-1002 states that:
(1)(a) A county, county attorney, or any owner of real
estate within the county in which violations of this
chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority of this
chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to
other remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any
other appropriate actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or
remove the unlawful building, use, or act.
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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permitted

in a specific zone is illegal and a court is fully

authorized to order its removal.

See U.C.A. §§ 17-27-23

(1987);

17-27-1002 (1) (b) (1992); Development Code 1.16.
Appellants' suggestion that it would be inequitable to remove
an "expensive" facility cannot override this legal principle.

The

only justification for recognizing nonconforming structures at all
is to protect

a landowner's

then existing

investments

in the

property -- not expansions made after enactment of the restrictive
ordinance.8

(b) A county need only establish the violation to
obtain the injunction.
(2) (a) The county may enforce
withholding building permits.

the

ordinance

by

(b) it is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct,
alter, or change the use of any building or other
structure within a county without approval of a building
permit.
(c) The county may not issue a building permit unless
the plans of and for the proposed erection, construction,
reconstruction, alteration, or use fully conform to all
regulations then in effect.
U.C.A. § 17-27-1002

(1992)

(emphasis added).

8

See City and County of Denver v. Board of Adjustment, 505
P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (precluding construction of new
nonconforming structures following the destruction of prior
nonconforming structures); Clackamas County v. Portland City
Temple, 511 P.2d 412 (Or.Ct.App. 1973) (affirming an injunction
restraining defendants from using a portion of property zoned
single family residential agricultural as an airport where the
improvements were made after the enactment of the ordinance);
Service Oil Co. v. Rhodus, 500 P.2d 807 (Colo. 1972) (holding that
an owner of a service station that was destroyed by fire had
abandoned the nonconforming use of the property since the owner
made no attempt to obtain a permit to rebuild until after the
abandonment period set forth in ordinance); see also 2 A. Rathkopf,
The Law of Zoning and Planning, 61-1 stating:
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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This principle is even more clear under the facts of this
case.

Here, not only was there a zoning ordinance, but Judge

Wilkinson

ordered

the

facility be removed before most of

expenses were incurred.
appeal and lost.

the

Summit County sought an interlocutory

Utelite was on notice that the facility could be

removed and deliberately took the risk that it would be when it
incurred further expenses.
Finally,

Appellants

erroneously

claim

there

must

be

a

"specific" finding that the facility is not a "accessory use to the
railroad's non-conforming use." There is no such requirement under
Utah law.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Mountain States, Etc. v. Atkin,

Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984) (stating that " [f] indings
of

fact

are

unnecessary

to

support

the

granting

of

summary

j udgment") .9
III. SUMMIT COUNTY VIOLATED THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT BY NOT
GIVING APPELLEES NOTICE
Appellants convolute a straight forward violation of the Open
and Public Meetings Act by arguing that the County's decision not

[T] he constitutional protection afforded the owner of
property on which a nonconforming use exists, exists only
in order to permit the continuance of the use to the
extent necessary to safeguard the investment of the
property owner.
Rathkopf at 61-1.
9

The Defendants cannot, and do not, state that Judge
Wilkinson did not consider their argument.
They made the same
claim as the basis for their Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment and as the basis for their Motion to Dismiss.
R. 161-179. Judge Wilkinson was not convinced, as is reflected in
the Conclusions of Law, that the County did not meet the provisions
of its Development Code.
g:\ jlw\echo\brief.a21
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to comply with the Act was "administrative" because it was made by
a County staff member who simply chose to "confirm" it with the
planning commission. This argument ignores the undisputed facts as
proven

by

Utelite's

own

sworn

responses

to

interrogatories.

Utelite's answers establish that the decision finding this use to
be "permitted" was made at a planning commission meeting with no
notice to the public.

See Utelite's Response to Plaintiffs' First

Set of Interrogatories No. 27, Addendum A. 1 to Appellees' Opening
Brief.
Furthermore, there is no "administrative" exception to notice
under the Open and Public Meetings Act.

The terms of the statute

and its announced public policy indicate actions taken by public
bodies must be done in open with notice:
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and
declares that the state, its agencies and political
subdivisions, exists to aid in the conduct of the
people's business.
It is the intent of the law that
their
actions
be
taken
openly
and
that
their
deliberations be conducted openly.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2 (1977).

Notice is a threshold procedural

requirement for any action taken by the Planning Commission and
there was no notice that the County Planning Commission would be
making the decision to allow Utelite to locate its facility in Echo
on property zoned rural-residential.

R. 97, 129; Addendum A. 11,

12 of Appellees' Opening Brief.
Appellants'

suggestion

that

complying with

the Act

would

impose an "immense burden, if not near paralysis" on governmental

g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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operations

is

without

any

evidentiary

support.10

An

equally

persuasive argument is that true paralysis will occur if a public
body in Utah must determine whether the decision it will make is
"administrative" or "legislative" before it gives notice of its
meetings.11

There are no standards or guidelines to follow, and

the difficulty in making such a determination would be immense.

It

was never the intent of the Act to force this decision on the
public body.

Instead, the avowed intent of the Act is that there

must be notice to assure action and deliberations are taken and
conducted openly.

Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2.

Finally, Appellants argue that the construction and operation
of the facility itself was sufficient notice of a violation of the
Open and Public Meetings Act to cause the running of a 90-day
limitations period.

However, as Appellants admit, the essentials

of the Act are notice and minutes of meetings.

When those are not

10

The consequences of complying with the Open and Public
Meetings Act are not an "absurdity" as the Appellants would like
this Court to think.
It is the examples presented by the
Appellants that are absurd. A closer analogy to the facts in this
case would be that the homeowner in Appellants' example wished to
construct a commercial loading facility in a subdivision zoned
residential that had a railroad track running through it. Surely
the Act intended that the planning commission would comply with its
mandates in such a situation.
11

Defendants' argument is not in line with the mandates of
the Open and Public Meetings Act. The Act applies to any "public
body" not specifically exempted and defines the term "public body"
to mean "any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative
body of the state or its political subdivisions." Utah Code Ann.
§ 52-4-2(2).
Thus, the Act does not distinguish between bodies
that are performing an administrative or a legislative function.

g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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provided, the essentials are hidden and the time limitations cannot
begin.
IV.

BY VIOLATING THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
CODE, SUMMIT COUNTY DEPRIVED APPELLEES OF DUE PROCESS
Appellants argue that the Appellees have failed to establish

(1) what process was due, and (2) how Appellees were deprived of
this process. However, the Appellees cited to the Development Code
and the Open Meetings Act, which both require notice.

The Act

further requires that minutes of meetings be kept. See Development
Code

§ 6.3;

U.C.A.

§§

52-4-6

and

52-4-7.

There

is also no

distinction regarding notice requirements between "legislative" and
"administrative" determinations.12 The mandates of the Development
Code and Utah law establish, on their face, "what process is due,"
and Appellees showed their rights had been violated.
Appellees established how they were deprived of this process
through the undisputed facts.
the agenda

for the December

The facts in evidence showed that
13, 1988 meeting of the

Planning

Commission provided no notice to the public that there would be a
discussion concerning the proposed relocation and construction of
the Utelite facility.

R. 97; 129, see Addendum A. 11, 12 of

Appellees' Opening Brief.

Also, the minutes of the meeting were

devoid of any reference to the Utelite facility.

R. 124-127,

Addendum A. 12 of Appellees' Opening Brief.

12

Section 52-4-6(2) requires that "each public body shall give
not less than 24 hours' public notice of the agenda, date, time and
place of each of its meetings, (emphasis added).
g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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This evidence clearly established violations of law.

Judge

Wilkinson carefully considered this evidence and ruled that the
actions of Summit County violated its Development Code and the Utah
Open Meetings Act, and that these "acts and omissions have harmed
Plaintiffs without providing them due process of law."

R. 282-3.

Thus, the trial court's finding was correct as a matter of law.
V.

APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in not awarding

attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.

In Lorenc v.

Call, 789 P.2d 46 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals
stated

that

"whether Plaintiff's complaint

states a claim

relief under section 1983 is a question of law."
(citations omitted).

for

Lorenc at 49

The Court quoted that:

[t]o state a claim for relief under section 1983, a
complainant need allege only (1) that some person
deprived complainant of a right, privilege or immunity
secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such
person acted under color of state law.
Id. at 49-50 (citations omitted).

Because the Plaintiff in Lorenc

alleged a due process claim at the trial level, which she further
developed on appeal, the Court concluded that she had stated a
constitutional claim for relief under section 1983.

Id. at 50.

Although the Court did not reach the constitutional claim, the
Court stated:
The United States Supreme Court has consistently
held that a Plaintiff is generally entitled to an award
of attorney fees under section 1988 if the Plaintiff
prevails on a statutory, non-civil-rights claim which is

g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21
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pendant to a substantial constitutional claim and which
arises from a "common nucleus of operative fact.
Id.

(citations omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has

reasoned that M[s]uch a fee award 'furthers the Congressional goal
of encouraging suits to vindicate constitutional rights without
undermining

the

longstanding

judicial

policy

of

avoiding

unnecessary decision of important constitutional issues.'"

Maher

v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 135, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2577, 65 L.Ed.2d 653
(1980) .
Despite Appellants' argument, it is clear that the Appellees
did allege a violation of due process claim in their original
Complaint, in their Amended Complaint, and in their Second Amended
Complaint.

Appellees have further developed their constitutional

claims in this appeal.

In addition, Appellees prevailed on the

pendent statutory Open and Public Meetings Act claim arising from
the "common nucleus of operative fact" that they were deprived of
notice.

Therefore, as recognized by this Court in Lorenc and the

United States Supreme Court, Appellees are entitled to attorneys
fees under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988.
VI.

THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD WAS NOT A NECESSARY
INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THIS LITIGATION

AND

The trial court was correct in ruling that the Union Pacific
Railroad ("Railroad") was not a necessary and indispensable party.
Appellants fail to analyze Rule 19 (a) or cite to a single case that
does so.

Under Rule 19(a) an absent entity is "necessary" and

shall be joined only where:
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(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded
among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest
relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
U.R.C.P. 19(a) (emphasis added).

The trial court's determination

must not be disturbed unless there is an abuse of discretion.
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
aff'd. sub nom., Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah
1990).
Judge Wilkinson did not abuse his discretion.

Appellees'

Prayer for Relief requested that the Utelite facility be removed
for

violating

zoning

Development Code.

requirements

under

the

Summit

County

Complete relief, removal of the facility, could

be obtained without the Railroad and Appellants have never said
otherwise.
On the other hand, Appellants recognizing that complete relief
would

be

afforded,

challenged

the

trial

court's

decision

by

asserting that "the Railroad has a direct interest in the outcome
of

the

litigation."

Appellants' Reply

at

13.

This

blanket

argument ignores Rule 19(a) (2) . Rule 19(a) (2) is conjunctive. The
entity must "claim an interest" and be so situated that disposition
of the action in its absence would impede its ability to protect
that interest.

U.R.C.P. 19(a) (2) (i) . At no time has the Railroad

"claimed an interest" as required by Rule 19(a) (2) . Its refusal to
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do

so

is a factor upon which

the trial

court

could

determining that it was not an indispensable party.

rely

in

See Moore' s §

19.07[2.-1] at pp. 19-104 - 19-105 (citing United States v. Sabine
Shell, Inc., 674 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that failure to
join property owners did not require reversal where they had not
attempted to intervene) [other citations omitted]).
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER PROHIBITING ALL DISCOVERY FROM
SUMMIT COUNTY WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting further
discovery against Summit County.13

Under Rule 26(b) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, any party is entitled to obtain discovery
from any other party regarding any matter in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the

existence,

location

of

description,

any persons

nature,

having

custody,

knowledge

of

condition,
any

and

discoverable

matter.
In their Brief, Appellants argue that the discovery sought by
Appellees against Summit County involved the very same factual and
legal issues covered in the Partial Summary Judgment. However, the
fact that

Partial

Summary Judgment was entered against

Summit

County requiring it to move the facility did not mean it lacked

13

After Appellees filed their Second Amended Complaint, the
trial court entered a blanket protective order prohibiting all
discovery against Summit County. R. at 775.
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relevant and discoverable information to remaining claims against
it and Utelite.14
For instance, Appellees had pending attorney's fees claims
which

were

discovered

in

dispute

information

against

Summit

County

and

had

learned through informal discovery

newly
that

Summit County was taking action to abandon the roadway upon which
Utelite was located in violation of the law.

The trial court's

order prohibited the formal discovery necessary to pursue that
issue.
Appellees also had pending claims against Utelite, the owner
and

operator

negligence.

of

the

facility,

for

nuisance,

trespass,

and

As a defense to these claims, before and during

trial, Utelite argued that its conduct in building and operating
the facility was reasonable because, among other things, Summit
County approved the facility and properly issued building permits.
Utelite's

Answers

prohibiting

to

discovery,

Interrogatories; R.
Appellees

could

2840

not

and

prepare

2845.
for

By
these

defenses .15

14

Summit County possessed relevant information regarding the
identity of witnesses and documents to be used at trial, its
involvement in the location and operation of the facility, and the
representatives of Summit County who Utelite would call as
witnesses. Furthermore, Summit County continued to participate in
the depositions of Appellees.
15

See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Summit County's
Motion for a Protective Order and Request for Oral Argument for
Plaintiffs' argument on the relationship of each Request to the
pending claims. R. at 725-31.
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VIII.

THE CONDUCT ALLEGED IN APPELLEES' NUISANCE
CLAIM WAS SUBJECT TO STATUTORY PROHIBITION
UNDER THE SUMMIT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CODE AND
UTAH LAW

Appellants continue to claim that the trial court erred when
it found that the conduct engaged in by Utelite was not subject to
a specific statutory prohibition.
this decision lightly.

The trial court did not make

It carefully examined the conduct, the

Summit County Development Code and the cases upon which Utelite
relies.

As set forth in Appellees' Opening Brief, loading rock

aggregate is a prohibited use under the Summit County Development
Code

§§

12.7

and

12.20.

incorporated into Utah law.

These

sections

are

specifically

Utah Code §§ 17-27-7, 8 and 23.16

A

violation like this is punishable as a criminal violation under the
Development Code and the Utah Code.

Thus, the argument that the

conduct is not prohibited by the law is erroneous.
prohibited,

and still

is, the facility

Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939, 943

Because it was

is a nuisance per se.
(Utah 1990); Branch v.

Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982).

16

Appellants note parenthetically that § 17-27-8 and 23 were
repealed in 1992. A careful examination indicates that the entire
zoning code was repealed and replaced in 1992.
However, the
replacement laws include Code sections that have provisions similar
to §§ 17-27-7, -8, and -23 that were in full force when the
facility was built. See e.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-27-302, 305,
1002.
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IX.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PROHIBITING APPELLEES
FROM FILING AN AMENDED COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE AND NOT PERMITTING EVIDENCE REGARDING ACCESS AND
THE PUBLIC ROAD
The trial court erred when it prohibited the Appellees from

filing an amended complaint to conform to the evidence.

Appellants

incorrectly argue that a trial court has complete discretion in
determining whether to allow amendment of a pleading, and that this
Court should not reverse the trial court's decision absent an abuse
of discretion. Appellants' Joint Reply at 16. Further, Appellants
attempt to paint the picture that the amendment would cause great
delay

and result

in substantial prejudice.

This analysis

is

flawed.
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is liberally
applied.

The Rule permits amendments "by leave of court" which

"shall be freely given when justice so requires."

U.R.C.P. 15(a).

The Rule allows "amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment."
U.R.C.P. 15(b) (emphasis added) .17
In Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d

94

(Utah 1981),

the Utah

Supreme Court had occasion to analyze the liberal policy in Utah
regarding amendment.

The Court stated:

17

Rule 54(c) (1) furthers the liberal amendment mandates of
Rule 15 by providing that "every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
pleadings." U.R.C.P. 54(c)(1). See Cheney v. Rucker, 381 P.2d 86,
91 (Utah 1963).
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Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of
court is a matter which lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court. This discretion, however, is to be
exercised in the furtherance of justice. The rule in
this state has always been to allow amendments freely
where justice requires, and especially is this true
before trial.
Lewis

at

98

(allowing amendment

where made before

trial, the

opposing party had adequate opportunity to meet the additional
issue raised, and neither party was placed in a position of any
greater advantage or disadvantage) (quoting Gillman v. Hansen, 486
P. 2d 1045

(Utah 1971)

(emphasis added) .

According to the Lewis

Court:
A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment
should be permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for
the opposing party to meet the newly raised matter.
Lewis at 98.

Further, according to Utah law, the stage of the

proceedings in which Plaintiffs seek leave to amend is not the
critical factor in determining whether leave should be granted.

As

clearly reasoned by the Utah Supreme Court:
Some tempest has been raised about the court
allowing the Plaintiff to make tardy amendments to the
pleadings. In doing so, he [the trial judge] wisely and
properly stated: "The pleadings are never more important
than the cause that is before the court . . . .
There
can be no prejudice in this case because we'll give ample
time for any answer . . . . " This is in harmony with
what we regard as the correct policy: of recognizing the
desirability of the pleadings setting forth definitely
framed issues, but also of permitting amendment where the
interest of justice so requires, and the adverse party is
given a fair opportunity to meet it.
Id.

(quoting Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products,

Inc., 515 P.2d 446 (Utah 1973)).
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Appellees
readiness

for

sought

leave

trial was

to amend

filed by any party

conference or trial dates had been set.
order

to plead

before

their claim

a certificate
and no

pre-trial

Amendment was required in

that Summit

County was

improperly

abandoning the road and to add a new claim that the
encroached upon a public road.18

of

facility

The motion came at the time the

Court had ordered for the conclusion of discovery - - a time that is
customary for such motions to be filed.

Appellants had ample

notice of these claims and adequate opportunity to meet these
issues.19

In fact, two months after the motion was filed, Utelite

itself supplemented its responses to discovery to name additional
witnesses which led to several witnesses being

identified

and

deposed.
In derogation of Utah law, the trial court would not permit
amendment.

The

court

attempted

to

justify

its

decision

by

18

In informal discovery Mr. Richins and his counsel learned
for the first time that the road was a class "B" road for which
Summit County had accepted public monies for maintenance. R. 659,
690-91, 805. Legal research showed that there was a "sister" claim
to nuisance known as encroachment on a public road.
They also
learned, two weeks before the end of the discovery period, that the
Summit County Commission was taking steps to abandon the road
without following statutory procedures. R. 690-91, 806.
19

After appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, Appellees
filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege that the placement of
the facility caused a nuisance. Utelite immediately served written
discovery, and both Utelite and Summit County deposed the
Plaintiffs. When asked about the basis for Mr. Richins and the
Dicker Hill Trust nuisance claims, Mr. Richins testified that the
facility blocked access to the property because it was built on a
public road that served as the primary access to his home. R. 83638, 639-43, 688.
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insisting that "the Plaintiffs can obtain the additional relief
they seek by filing a new civil action in this court."
This statement by the trial court defied logic.
before the Court.20

The parties were

The discovery had been done and the proposed

claims arose out of a core of facts.
167, 170

R. 1028-29.

(Utah 1954)

See Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d

(holding that amendments conforming to the

evidence should be liberally allowed and that limitations thereon
should be determined by whether the matters involved can be handled
in one trial).
Further, the trial court committed error by refusing to allow
Mr. Richins to present evidence regarding access to his property.
Appellants argue that there was not a specific allegation that
placed access or the public road in issue.

However, in their

Second Amended Verified Complaint, Appellees alleged that Utelite
was liable for the inconvenience, annoyance, discomfort, and other
nuisance resulting from their placement of the facility.

R. 312.

In

written

discovery,

the

access

discovery and depositions.

question

was

the

R. 832, 836-38.

focus

of

Among other things,

the proposed amendment was designed to more particularly describe
how the lack of access was a nuisance.

Thus, if there was any

doubt about the pleading, notice was certainly imparted as to the

20

As stated above, removal of the facility, did not depend
on the Railroad.
The issues did not present a title question.
Even if they did, Utelite could have easily presented any evidence
it had to show it was justified in placing its facility where it
did.
Nothing would have prohibited it from doing so if the
amendment was allowed. See argument VI. above.
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claim, it was amply discovered, and amendment would have simply
amplified it.
Finally, the Appellants claim that the Appellees did not
"proffer" the evidence they would have offered and that without the
evidence this Court cannot determine whether the exclusion of the
evidence offered affected the trial.

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d

147 (Utah 1987); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) . The law in Utah is quite clear.

If a trial court

is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue, it is preserved.
Onyeabor,

787

P. 2d

525.

Under

this

standard,

the

issue

was

certainly preserved when the trial court denied the motion to
amend.

See Handy v. Handy, 776 P.2d 917, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

(quoting State v. One 1979 Pontiac Trans Am., 771 P.2d. 682, 684
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
The trial court abused its discretion by denying the Motion to
Amend and refusing to allow Appellees to plead and present evidence
regarding access.
these

claims

The Appellees should be entitled to present

should

this

case

be

reversed

because

they

are

important to damages and further equitable relief.
X.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING THE JURY TO
VIEW THE FACILITY IN OPERATION.
Appellants'

seek

to

justify

the

trial

court's

decision

allowing the jury to see a staged operation of the facility by
arguing that Appellees were seeking future damages.

Indeed, the

trial court indicated that the basis for its ruling was that it

g:\jlw\echo\brief.a21

21

would be "probative on the issue of current damages . . . [and]
present lost property values."

R. at 2664-65.

In direct contrast to this, however, the trial court only
permitted a claim for past damages when the case went to the jury.
R. 1988-90.

The trial court also advised the jury that there was

an order to remove the facility.

R. 1985-86.

Thus, the court's

rational for allowing the jury view because the Appellees were
seeking more than "past damages" was completely undercut when the
court restricted damages to the date of trial and told the jury
that the facility would be removed.
Moreover, the Appellants' argument that the trial court told
the jury that the view would only depict how the facility operated
on the day of the view underscores the problem of allowing the jury
to view the facility at. all. As noted in Appellees' Opening Brief,
the jury saw a make-believe demonstration and did not witness
Utelite's typical operating conditions21.

Utelite had moved just

one car into place for loading, and did not clean the car by
banging it and opening the doors.

All of the debris typically

surrounding the facility had been cleaned up. Because the view was

21

In their brief the Appellants claim Utelite "offered
evidence from various witnesses that the condition observed at the
Facility on September 14, 1995 was typical."
One of these
"witnesses," Wilda Peterson, a waitress at the Kozy Kafe, was not
even present the day of the jury view. R. at 2927. Another could
not recall if he had ever seen the facility operate. R. at 2797.
Robert Swenson did not even know whether the facility was operating
when he had seen it.
R. at 2956.
Finally, Brett Atkinson, a
Utelite truck driver, said that generally all four drivers were not
there to help each other get through the operation. R. at 2921.
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not representative, it should not have been permitted.

See State

v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993) (upholding a trial court's
denial of a motion to view a crime scene where it was unlikely that
the site would be in the same condition as it was three months
earlier); see also State ex rel. Road Commission, 449 P.2d 114
(Utah 196 9) (finding an abuse of discretion where, in a takings
case involving property valuation, the jury was permitted to view
certain structures a considerable time after the taking and changes
had occurred as to render the view of no assistance to the jury).
XI.

THE TRIAL COURTS DETERMINATION THAT THE FACILITY IS NOT
PRESENTLY A NUISANCE IS CLEAR ERROR
In their Brief, Appellants do not address the primary problem

with the trial court's belated determination

that the Utelite

facility, at the time of trial, was not a nuisance.

As a result of

erroneous evidentiary rulings Appellees were unable to, among other
things,

demonstrate

that

the

facility

constitutes

an

ongoing

nuisance that adversely affects the Appellees' use or enjoyment of
their property.

Additionally, since the trial was on "damages,"

Appellees could not introduce evidence on the way the facility was
located to support further equitable relief.
Contrary to the Appellants' arguments, Appellees have set
forth specific and detailed facts demonstrating the facility was a
nuisance at the time of trial. Appellees' Opening Brief, Statement
of Facts pages 15-20.

Appellees also filed timely objections to

the Findings and Conclusions prepared by Utelite's counsel. R.
2198-2211.

The record clearly shows that these findings of fact
23
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were contradicted by substantial evidence.

Attached hereto as

Exhibit "A" are the specific Findings of Fact and the substantial
evidence, with record citations, showing that the Findings are
clearly erroneous.
XII. A NEW TRIAL FOR ALL DAMAGES MUST OCCUR IN THE EVENT OF
REVERSAL
The primary relief sought by Appellees was, and continues to
be, to have the facility removed.
will finally end this case.

Affirming the order of removal

Should this Court reverse, however,

the issue of all damages suffered by the Appellees flowing from the
placement and operation of the facility must be presented to a jury
that has all of Appellees' claims and all of the facts before it.
Any other result will support a jury verdict that was unfairly
based upon two erroneous instructions.
only be
removed.

for past harms.

First, that damages could

Second, that the

facility would be

There can be no doubt the jury's verdict was impacted by

these instructions.
Appellants

mistakenly

claim

that

Appellees

had

the

full

opportunity to present evidence of damages and Utelite's conduct
that meriting punitive damages.
such a claim.

The history of this case belies

As set out above, Appellees were not allowed to

engage in key discovery or to put all of their claims and evidence
before the jury.

Should there be a reversal, the jury must have

every claim with all supporting evidence before it.
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CONCLUSION
The

only way

that

Summit

County's

effective is if they are enforced.

zoning

ordinances

are

In this case that requires an

affirmance of the order of removal. Appellees request the Court of
Appeals affirm the trial court's order requiring Summit County to
remove the Utelite facility so that the Summit County Development
Code and the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act are honored and this
case ends.
,TCA
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EXHIBIT A
At the time Utelite filed its proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law: Re Equitable Relief, the Plaintiffs objected.
Since a record had not been prepared,
specific record citations.

they could not provide

This Exhibit follows the objections

with record citations.

FACT 1:

The Defendant Utelite Corporation ("Utelite") operates a

loading facility

(the "Facility") adjacent to the Union Pacific

railroad tracks at Echo, Utah.
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

The

statement

that

the

facility

is

"adjacent" to the Union Pacific railroad track is misleading and
incomplete.

The

evidence, show:

uncontested

facts,

as

demonstrated

by

the

(1) Utelite located its facility in an area zoned

as Rural Residential 2 (R. at 2383-84);

(2) Utelite located its

facility above the culinary water line that serves the residents of
Echo, Utah, which impedes access to the line

(R. 2569-70) ; (3)

Utelite located its facility on the road that Richard and Ruth
Richins traditionally used which causes inconvenience

(R. 2642,

2672); and (4) Utelite located its facility on and then moved the
Echo Ditch that serves agricultural users without permission (R.
2679-80).

FACT 2:
Facility.

The Plaintiffs

own property

in the vicinity

of the

The Union Pacific railroad tracks that run through Echo,

Utah lie between the Facility and the property owned by Jane
Harper, Richard D. Harper and Frank Cattelan.

Trains go through

Echo, Utah on these tracks in excess of fifteen to twenty times per

day.
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:
ambiguous.

The term "in the vicinity" is vague and

The Plaintiffs Jane and Richard Harper own property

that is directly across from the facility.

(R. 2387).

Plaintiff

Frank Cattelan owns property that is contiguous to the Harpers.
(R. 2556) .

The Dicker Hill Trust owns property that is close to

the Utelite facility and that has been primarily served by the road
upon which Utelite built its facility.

FACT 3:

(R. 2650-55; 2668; 2690).

At the Facility on a weekly basis, Utelite loads an

average of six and one-half railroad cars with its kiln dried
aggregate products.
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

This Finding is vague, misleading and does

not

the

accurately

reflect

admitted

evidence.

The

admitted

evidence indicated that Utelite would load on some days and not
others and there was no way for the Plaintiffs to know when loading
would occur.

(R. 24 02).

The evidence further showed there were

days when Utelite would load all day and into the evening.
2402).

(R.

A log, admitted as Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial, documents

Utelite's loading from the time the trucks began to arrive to the
time they leave and the number of cars loaded.

This log indicates

that, on average, more than six and one-half rail cars were loaded
per week.

FACT 4:

(R. 2588-89).

Semi-trucks

transport

the

aggregate

product

to

the

Facility for loading. It takes four trucks approximately forty
minutes to load a single railroad car.

2

CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:
accurately

reflect

The Finding is misleading and does not

the admitted

evidence.

In particular, the

statement that "it takes four trucks approximately forty minutes to
load a single rail car" implies a rail car is loaded in forty
minutes.

The evidence was that the loading occurs as trucks come

to the facility.
rail car.

At times only one truck will be used to load a

This means the loading of one rail car will occur over

several hours.

(Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial).

procedure for loading takes time.
cars into place.
partially loaded.

FACT 5:

In addition, the

Truck drivers must move rail

At times, the rail cars sit at the site while
(R. 2383).

The Utelite Facility currently operates, with occasional

exceptions, on weekdays during daylight hours.
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

"Occasional exceptions" is not defined and

the evidence showed that Utelite had just before trial loaded as
late as 10:00 p.m.

FACT 6:

(R. 2595; 2858; Exhibits 19 and 20 at trial).

To deal with dust from the loading operations, Utelite

has taken the following steps:
a.

Construction of a metal enclosure at the Facility.

b.

Installation of a bag house and duct work at the
Facility.

c.

Paving of the access road to the Facility.

d.

Installation of curtains and an electric door at
the Facility.

e.

Watering down aggregate at the Utelite plant.

f•

Installation of a hood and metal coverings over the
conveyor belt and drop areas at the Facility.
3

g.

Response to resident complaints called in to the
Utelite plant including termination of loading on
windy days.

CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

Steps

taken

by

Utelite

to

control

aggregate should not be the basis for denying equitable relief
unless their continued implementation, maintenance and/or existence
actually preclude Utelite aggregate from migrating to Plaintiffs'
properties so that Plaintiffs' health is not harmed, the Plaintiffs
are not inconvenienced and the Plaintiffs can peacefully enjoy
their property.

Most of the witnesses testified that dust still

migrates and continues to cause health symptoms like wheezing,
coughing and running eyes.
inconvenience.

The migrating aggregate also causes

(R. 2387-94; 2586; 2654; 2690-91; 2695-97) . Recent

pictures were admitted showing Utelite aggregate in the bedroom of
Mr. and Mrs. Harper's son as a result of it blowing from the
facility.

(R. 2394; Exhibit 14 at trial).

Samples collected from

the windows of the Harper home showed Utelite aggregate on the
windows.

(R. 2772; Exhibits 78, 79, 80, 84, and 85 at trial).

This migration of lightweight aggregate occurred up to the date of
trial.
The

(R. 2395-98; 2654; 2579-86). x
substantial

evidence

does

not

support

the

following

lettered paragraphs:
Subparagraph 6 (a) . The term "metal enclosure" is misleading.
Utelite constructed a chain link fence that does not "enclose" the
facility to prohibit dust, and is much lower than the conveyor from
1

The Jury did not find that general damages had stopped
because of the Utelite changes. The Jury was instructed that it
could not award damages past the day of trial and that the court
had ordered the facility to be removed. There is nothing in the
Jury verdict that the annoyance, inconvenience, health hazards and
degraded enjoyment of property have ended.
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which aggregate migrates.

(R. 2855-56; 2500).

on the road and railroad tracks.
2948).

Aggregate is left

(R. 2501; 2579; 2742-45; 2906;

This aggregate migrates to Plaintiffs' properties.

2579-86; 2654) .

The chain link fence does not

(R.

"enclose" this

aggregate at all or the aggregate that comes from the conveyor.
(R. 2500) .

Additionally, the fence is frequently left open and

must be open at the time Utelite loads its aggregate.

(R. 2500;

2745).
Subparagraph 6 (b).
the

conveyor

system,

The "baghouse" only collects dust from

not

the

entire

facility.

The

blowing

aggregate occurs during dumping and when aggregate is left on the
roadway and facility, even when Utelite is not loading.

(See

Subparagraph (a), supra).
Subparagraph 6 (c) . Utelite leaves deposits of its aggregate
on the paved road which migrates to Plaintiffs' property on windy
days.

(See Subparagraph (a) , supra) . Thus, the paving of the road

does not preclude blowing aggregate.

(id.)

air quality permit by leaving aggregate.

Utelite violates its
(R. 2729-30).

Utelite

only cleaned up the aggregate from the road and rail tracks just
before the trial.

(R. 2674-76; 2906).

Subparagraph 6 (d) . The curtains "installed" on the facility
have been ripped and torn for a number of years and did not
prohibit blowing aggregate.
at the facility
periods.

is

(R. 2504; 2905).

The "electric door"

"sometimes" used and is open for extended

(R. 2504; 2744-45).

Subparagraph 6 (e) . There was no evidence of the degree that
aggregate is watered down at the Utelite plant or the frequency
that this is done.

The migration of the aggregate demonstrates

that this "watering" down does not work.

(R. 2501; Subparagraph

(a), supra).
Subparagraph 6 (f).

The installation of the hood and metal

coverings has not stopped the migration of dust.

(See Subparagraph

(a), supra).
Subparagraph 6 (g) . In opening argument, counsel for Utelite
claimed there was one instance where truckers were advised by Kip
Bigelow through electronic communications to shut down.

(Argument

of Eric Olson) . Mr. Bigelow's testimony indicated there was no way
to communicate to the truckers while on location.

(R. 3 010).

Plaintiff Richard Harper testified that Utelite only quit on one
occasion after it had finished loading.

(R. 2531) . The only other

evidence that Utelite quit loading was one instance that occurred
shortly before trial when Richard Harper complained to the persons
loading.

(R. 2530-31; 2922).

The claim that Utelite quit loading was rebutted by Utelite's
own employees and agents.
blowing in Echo.

(R. 2871; 2739).

does blow on windy days.

FACT 7:

Utelite does not know when the wind is
In fact, the Utelite aggregate

(R. 2501; 2579-86; 2653-54; 2675-77).

To deal with noise problems from the operation of the

Facility, Utelite has taken the following steps:
a.

Installation of a muffler on the bag house.

b.

Instruction to truckers not to bang railroad cars
in connection with loading.

CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

Steps taken by Utelite to deal with noise

cannot be the basis for denying equitable relief unless they work
and are continually implemented.
6

The evidence showed that the

Utelite facility is still noisy because the moving of railroad cars
causes squeaking and banging, because the opening of the lids on
the railroad cars causes banging, because persons loading Utelite
bang on rail cars to clean and open them despite instructions from
Utelite, because the engine noise from semi-trucks can be heard at
the Harpers7 home, because the engine noise from the baghouse (even
with muffler) is still loud enough to be an annoyance, and because
the railroad

engines

at night

generate noise when

they bring

railroad cars to the facility and remove railroad cars.

(R. 2406-

17) .
Subparagraph 7 (a) . The evidence showed that the installation
of a muffler on the bag house reduced the noise but it still
precludes

the Plaintiffs

from the peaceful enjoyment of their

property, particularly on days when the wind blows toward the
Harpers.

Plaintiffs Harpers

cannot hear

in their yard

under

certain conditions, and cannot play with their children in their
yard.

(R. 2386-2417; Exhibit 12 at trial).
Subparagraph

7

(b) .

The

evidence

showed

that

despite

instructions from Utelite, the truckers continue to bang on the
cars to load and clean them.

FACT 8:

(R. 2505; 2740; 2925).

To deal with other annoyances, Utelite has:

a.

Removed outdoor lighting at the Facility.

b.

Terminated night loading.

c.

Instructed truck drivers to yield to other vehicles
seeking access to the frontage road on the far side
of Interstate 84 through the road at the Facility.

CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:

Steps taken by Utelite to deal with other

annoyances cannot be the basis for denying equitable relief if the

conditions causing the nuisance continue.

Plaintiffs specifically

object to the lettered portions of paragraph 8 as follows:
Subparagraph 8 (b) . The evidence showed continued to load in
the evenings up to 9:00 p.m.

(R. 2595; 2858; Exhibits 19 and 20 at

trial).
Subparagraph 8 (c) . There was evidence introduced to support
that Utelite has instructed drivers to so yield.

FACT 9:

As a result of the actions taken by Utelite, confirmed by

the Court's visit

to the Facility while

in operation and the

Court's and third-party's review of videos, tapes and photographs
of the Facility in operation, the Facility at present
injurious to the Plaintiffs,

(a) is not

(b) does not adversely affect the

Plaintiff's use and enjoyment of their property, and (c) does not
cause any property damage to the Plaintiffs.
CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE:
continues

to cause

The evidence

showed

that

injuries and inconvenience

the

facility

and lessens the

enjoyment of Plaintiffs' property in the following ways:
a.

Jane Harper and her children have and continue to

suffer from breathing problems caused by the aggregate (R.
2386-2417);
b.

Jane Harper and Richard Harper's house is still

affected by migrating dust.

They must clean more often, the

dust gets into their children's bedrooms and on their home's
windows (R. 2386-2417; Exhibits 12, 13, 14 at trial);
c.

Jane and Richard Harper cannot eat vegetables from

their garden without taking precautionary measures because of
the aggregate that migrates to their vegetable garden
8

(R.

2386-2417);
d.

Jane Harper cannot sleep in the day because of noise

generated from the Utelite facility (R. 2386-2417; Exhibit 12
at trial);
e.

Richard

and

Jane

Harper

are

awakened

at

night

because of noise caused by the railroad moving rail cars used
to transport the Utelite aggregate (R. 2386-2417);
f.

Frank Cattelan has and continues to suffer from

breathing problems caused by the aggregate;
g.

Frank Cattelan's cafe and house are still affected

by migrating dust.

He must clean more often as a result of

the aggregate (R. 2586);
h.

Ruth and Richard Richins must now cross a very

dangerous rail crossing and cannot move some farm equipment on
the road they have traditionally used (R. 2653; 2689); and
i.

Richard Richins must now clean an irrigation ditch

that was moved by Utelite without permission (R. 2687-88).

